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I. Introduction
Five years after United States v. Booker (543 U.S. 220,
2005) rendered the federal sentencing guidelines "effec-
tively advisory," concern is growing among some
commentators about a surge in inter-judge sentencing dis-
parity in the federal system.' At its regional hearings in
2009, the United States Sentencing Commission has
received anecdotal reports, especially from prosecutors, of
increasingly sharp differences between judges.2 Attorney
General Eric Holder has called for an assessment of
whether post-Booker sentencing practices "show an
increase in unwarranted sentencing disparities" based on
"differences in judicial philosophy among judges working
in the same courthouse."3
Not all forms of disparity in sentencing are a cause
for concern, 4 but inter-judge disparity is widely recog-
nized as unwarranted. A central purpose of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to reduce disparity
driven by individual judges' philosophies, preferences,
and biases. Congress was convinced that similarly situ-
ated offenders were receiving widely variable sentences
depending on which judge happened to be assigned to
the case.5 Mandatory sentencing guidelines, applicable to
all judges and all offenders, were supposed to address
that problem. Strong evidence supports the conclusion
that the federal guidelines, despite their well-documented
shortcomings, succeeded in reducing judge-to-judge sen-
tencing disparity.
6
Does Booker mark a step backward in Congress's effort
to promote consistency between judges? Acquiring any-
thing more than anecdotal evidence is difficult because
the Sentencing Commission does not disclose the identity
of the sentencing judge in its publicly available data and
reports. The Commission states, for example, that the
nationwide rate of below-range sentencing has increased
since Booker, from 8.6% in FY 2003 and 5.5% under the
PROTECT Act in FY 2004, to 12.0% in FY 2005 after
Booker and 15.9% in FY 2009.7 But the Commission does
not report how individual judges are imposing sentences,
and that policy frustrates efforts to measure the perfor-
mance of the Guidelines against one of Congress's
principal objectives.
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II. The Boston Study
Fortunately, one district court-the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts-has adopted a unique
policy making the Statement of Reasons for almost all
sentences available to the public.8 Using information from
those documents in conjunction with the Commission's
data, as well as a case-matching technique pioneered by
Max Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller,9 I have compiled
a data set of more than 2,2oo sentences from 2002 to
20o8 by a core group of judges in Boston who served
continuously throughout that period."0 Although a single
district court is not necessarily representative of the nation
as a whole, and the judges of the District of Massachusetts
share a special interest and expertise in sentencing
issues," the Boston data offer an unprecedented look at
post-Booker sentencing patterns. They reveal how individ-
ual judges, working alongside one another and drawing
from a common case pool, have responded to a series of
extraordinary changes in federal sentencing law.
To facilitate comparisons between pre- and post-Booker
sentencing, I divided the sentences into five time periods:
i. Mandatory Guidelines: October i, 2ooi-April 30,
2003 (approximately 19 months)
2. PROTECT Act: May I, 2003-June 23, 2004 (approx-
imately 14 months)
3. Post-Booker I: January 12, 2oo5-June 30, 2006
(approximately 18 months)
4. Post-Booker II: July I, 2oo6-December 9, 2007
(approximately 17 months)
5. Kimbrough/Gall: December io, 2007-September
30, 2008 (approximately io months)
These periods track the key statutory changes and
Supreme Court decisions between October 20oi and Sep-
tember 2oo8, and include about io months of data since
the Supreme Court's decisions in Kimbrough and Gall in
December 2007.12 To ensure a fair comparison between
judges, the study was limited to cases from the Boston
division, where more than a dozen judges draw from a
common case pool using a random case-distribution
Mandatory PROTECT Act Post-Booker I Post-Booker II Kimbrough/Gall
Guidelines 2003-2004 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
2002-2003
Figure 1: Distribution of Below-Range Sentencing Rates
deck."3 Sentences by judges who did not carry a sufficient
case load during any two-year period were excluded.4
III. A First Look at Post-Booker Guideline Sentencing
The preliminary evidence from Boston reinforces what
has been reported anecdotally in district courts throughout
the country: Sharp and growing differences are apparent
in guideline sentencing patterns between judges in the
same courthouse. With some judges sentencing below the
guideline range far more frequently than their colleagues,
a defendant's odds of receiving a downward departure or
variance increasingly depend on which judge happens to
draw the case.
Figure r shows the distribution of average rates of
below-guideline sentencing among Boston judges,
arranged by time period. Each dot represents the average
for a single judge during that period.
After a contraction under the PROTECT Act, the distri-
bution in rates of below-range sentencing widened beyond
pre- Booker levels and has continued to grow. Since Booker,
some judges in Boston continue to sentence below the
guideline range as low as io% of the time, whereas others
are sentencing below the guideline range more than 40%
or even 5o% of the time. One senior judge sentenced
below the guideline range a remarkable 71% of the time
during the eighteen months after Booker, more than six
times the rate of one of his colleagues. 5
The data from Boston also allow a first look at how
individualjudges' sentencing patterns under the Guide-
lines have changed since Booker. Figure 2 shows changes
in the average rate of below-range sentencing for all Boston
judges combined.
The average stood at 18.4% under the mandatory
guidelines, fell to 13.3% under the PROTECT Act, and
jumped to about 30% in all three periods after Booker. But
aggregated figures such as these, like the Commission's
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Figure 2: Average Below-Range Sentencing
Rates, All Judges
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Figure 3: (a) Guideline Sentencing, Judge A; (b) Guideline Sentencing, Judge B; (c) Guideline Sen-
tencing, Judge C; and (d) Guideline Sentencing, Judge D
reports, mask significant variation in how individual
judges have responded to the decision.
Figures 3a through 3d overlay the sentencing patterns
of four Boston judges (judges A, B, C, and D) with the
average pattern to illustrate how individual judges' responses
to Booker may differ from the average, as well as from the
responses of the other judges.
Sentences by Judge A roughly fit the average guideline
sentencing pattern for all Boston judges, with a noticeable
decline in below-range sentences under the PROTECT
Act, followed by an even larger increase after Booker. By
contrast, each of the other judges' sentencing patterns fits
a distinctive shape, typical of others in the data set:
Sentences by Judge B fit a "free at last"' 6 pattern: a
low rate of below-range sentencing in the two pre-
Booker periods (ii.i% and 10.5%) and a much
higher rate in the three post-Booker periods (40.0%,
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37.5%, and 52.8%). Judge B's rate of below-range
sentencing more than quadrupled after Booker. I7
Sentences by Judge C fit a "business as usual" pat-
tern, with very little change between periods. Judge
C's rate of below-range sentencing moved less than
one-half of one percent between the PROTECT Act
and the first 18 months after Booker, from 10.5% to
lo.o%, and also remained relatively stable in the
Mandatory Guidelines (13.3%), Post-Booker II
(I9.I%), and Kimbrough/Gall (16.1%) periods. 8
Sentences by Judge D fit a "return to form" pattern,
in which Booker effectively nullified the effects of
the PROTECT Act. Judge D's rate of below-range
sentencing stood at 32.7% in the Mandatory Guide-
lines period, but plummeted to 5.6% under the
PROTECT Act. After slowly increasing to 17.0% in
the eighteen months after Booker, Judge D's rate
returned to 38.6% and 34.6% in the two most
recent periods.
The sharp differences between the "free at last," "busi-
ness as usual," and "return to form" patterns in Boston
suggest fundamental disagreements between judges about
the guidelines. Plus, they tend to confirm reports from
prosecutors that inter-judge disparity in guideline sentenc-
ing has become more acute since Booker.
IV. Implications
What explains the growing split between judges in guide-
line sentencing? The raw data do not provide answers,
but two explanations seem plausible. First, now that the
Guidelines are advisory, some judges may actually agree
with the recommended guideline sentence more often
than their colleagues. Although many judges have criti-
cized the Guidelines for their severity, surveys of district
court judges have long reported sharp divisions, with a
substantial contingent responding that the Guidelines
effectively achieve the purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C.
3553(a).' 9 Booker has allowed those differences of opinion
to drive sentencing outcomes more frequently.
Second, some judges may be persuaded to impose
within-guideline sentences for institutional reasons: defer-
ence to the Commission as an expert body, a belief that
the Guidelines carry special empirical and democratic
legitimacy, or a commitment to the project of inter-judge
sentencing uniformity20 Others, by contrast, may have
serious institutional doubts about the Commission and
the process by which it formulated the Guidelines, and
therefore more readily disregard its advice. These explana-
tions undoubtedly interact. Confronted with a case for
which the advisory guideline sentence seems a little too
high, but not grossly unjust, a judge's assessment of the
institutional strengths of the Guidelines and the Commis-
sion may tip the scales.
To be sure, inter-judge disparity is but one consider-
ation among many in evaluating the federal sentencing
system. It is entirely possible that Booker has, on balance,
produced more just sentences by allowing judges greater
flexibility and authorizing them to reject unsound guide-
lines, despite the corresponding increase in inter-judge
disparity. And plenty of other federal sentencing priorities
deserve attention on the fifth anniversary of Booker,
including the elimination of the loo:1 crack-to-powder
ratio in drug sentencing, reevaluation of the wisdom of
mandatory minimum sentences, and investigation of
unwarranted disparity created by prosecutorial charging
and bargaining practices."
Nonetheless, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity
was one of Congress's primary goals in the Sentencing
Reform Act, and evidence of backsliding ought to be taken
seriously. No offender should spend years in jail, and no
crime victim should be denied a full measure of justice,
solely because of the judge assigned to the case. Based on
a first look at guideline sentencing patterns since Booker,
the Boston study offers preliminary evidence that con-
cerns about an increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity
are well-founded.
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